Metacognitive inferences about ownership for one's implicit attitudes have the power to turn implicit bias into explicit prejudice. In Study 1, participants were assigned to construe their implicit attitudes toward gay men as belonging to themselves (owned) or as unrelated to the self (disowned). Construing one's implicit responses as owned led to greater implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. In Study 2, we measured ownership for implicit attitudes as well as self-esteem. We predicted that ownership inferences would dictate explicit attitudes to the degree that people had positive views of the self. Indeed, higher ownership for implicit bias was associated with greater implicit-explicit attitude correspondence, and this effect was driven by participants high in self-esteem. Finally, in Study 3, we manipulated inferences of ownership and measured self-esteem. Metacognitions of ownership affected implicit-explicit attitude correspondence but only among those with relatively high self-esteem. We conclude that subjective inferences about implicit bias affect explicit prejudice.
Our thoughts sometimes seem as if they do not belong to us at all. We say that a thought "came to mind" or "occurred to me" as if our minds were passive observers. At other times, we gladly take possession, claiming a thought as "my idea" or "my belief." Research on authorship processing has suggested that such feelings of ownership and orphanage are not direct perceptions of cognitive processes but instead are metacognitive inferences (Wegner, 2002) . The difference between owned and disowned cognitions has featured prominently in debates about the nature of implicit and explicit attitudes. In this article, we provide evidence that inferences of ownership have important consequences for whether implicit bias is explicitly endorsed. We propose that when automatic evaluations are perceived as alien, they will not be explicitly endorsed. In contrast, we expect that people will be likely to endorse an attitude if they perceive it as belonging to the self. Some selves, however, are held in higher esteem than others. The ultimate impact of perceiving ownership of implicit attitudes might therefore depend on self-esteem.
Theoretical Background
Some early research on the validity of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) suggested that this measure might be sensitive to influences other than respondents' personal attitudes. Karpinski and Hilton (2001) reported that an IAT measuring attitudes toward apples and candy bars showed a pronounced preference for apples, but it did not predict behavior when participants chose between the two items. The authors suggested that the IAT may reflect environmental associations, such as a cultural norm that people should prefer apples to candy bars. Choice behavior, in contrast, was argued to be driven by personal liking for apples and candy bars. Olson and Fazio (2004) extended this reasoning and argued that the IAT confounds personal attitudes, defined as summary evaluations of an object, and extra-personal evaluations reflecting cultural knowledge. To separate personal and extra-personal associations, Olson and Fazio (2004) developed a "personalized" IAT, primarily by changing the category labels used in the standard IAT from "pleasant" and "unpleasant" to "I like" and "I don't like." The personalized IAT was more successful than the traditional IAT at predicting a choice between apples and candy bars. In another study, scores on a traditional IAT were influenced by exposure to the misinformed opinions of schoolboys, but the personalized IAT was not (Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006) . These studies suggest that personal evaluations reflect associations between an attitude object and one's likes and dislikes, whereas associations between an attitude object and the general categories "good" and "bad" may reflect both personal likes and cultural associations. From this perspective, personal and extra-personal associations refer to separate sets of associations in memory.
Ownership as a Conscious Judgment
An alternative view is that ownership is not a property of the memory associations per se but instead is a metacognitive inference people make about those associations. Banaji, Nosek, and Greenwald (2004) argued that the judgment of ownership is a conscious judgment and thus, "it is less sensible to think of a sharp line between person and culture when thinking about implicit cognition" (pp. 284-285; see also Nosek & Hansen, 2008) . Under this reasoning, the associations assessed by implicit measures do not consist of separate representations of personal beliefs and cultural beliefs but rather ownership information can be applied to existing cognitive associations. The spontaneous way in which implicit attitudes are activated may lead people, at times, to question their origin. These thoughts about origin may then have implications for explicit prejudice. Gawronski, Peters, and LeBel (2008) reviewed several possible criteria that might be used to distinguish personal and extra-personal attitudes and argued that less emphasis should be placed on whether implicit associations are objectively personal or extra-personal. Instead, these authors suggested that research should explore people's subjective beliefs about their mental associations. This idea that perceived ownership may be the output of metacognitive inferences about one's own cognitive processes is suggested by metacognitive models of attitudes.
Metacognitive Models of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes
Several theoretical models implicate thoughts about implicit attitudes, or metacognitions, as a key factor determining the relationship (or lack thereof) between implicit and explicit evaluations. First, the Metacognitive Model of attitudes (MCM; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007) distinguishes between evaluative associations that are activated from memory and validity tags that are applied to them. Validity tags are considered to be the result of metacognitive inferences about whether the attitude is valid or not. The Associative-Propositional model of Evaluation (APE; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) claims that automatically activated associations provide input into a propositional reasoning process that assigns truth values. Based on propositional reasoning, people may accept the activated information as valid or reject it as invalid. Finally, the Motivations and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE; Fazio, 1990 ) model has also been applied to understanding implicit-explicit attitude correspondence (Olson & Fazio, 2009) . Although the MODE model does not directly address the role of metacognitions, the model is consistent with the idea that thoughts about implicit attitudes can affect the explicit expression of prejudice. In particular, the MODE model emphasizes the importance of motivations and opportunity in determining whether people express implicit attitudes in overt behavior. Behavioral responses are assumed to be driven by automatically activated evaluations when motivations or opportunity to deliberate are low. When motivation and opportunity are both high, behaviors will tend to be made deliberatively and may be influenced by a variety of factors other than automatic evaluations, including metacognitions about the validity or appropriateness of one's attitudes. In sum, existing models of implicit-explicit attitude correspondence focus on validity tags (MCM) and truth values (APE) attached to mental associations, as well as the necessity of resources for people to deliberate about these associations (MODE), rather than characteristics of the automatically activated associations themselves.
In addition to the validity inferences highlighted by the MCM and APE models, people might also make inferences about whether the evaluation is intended. For example, Cooley, Payne, and Phillips (2014) encouraged subjects to construe their implicit evaluations of gay couples as either intentional or unintentional and then measured explicit homophobia using a questionnaire. They found that subjects led to interpret their implicit evaluations as unintended showed little association between implicit and explicit attitudes. Subjects who interpreted their implicit biases as intentional, however, were more likely to report those attitudes explicitly, resulting in high implicit-explicit correspondence.
One framework useful for integrating these different kinds of inferences is the Situated Inference Model of priming (SIM; Loersch & Payne, 2011) . This model was designed to account for the mechanisms by which information made accessible by priming can affect judgment, motivation, and behavior. Thoughts about ownership of primed information play a prominent role in the SIM. The model predicts that thoughts or feelings activated by primes are used to guide future responses to the extent that they are interpreted as one's own thoughts and feelings. In past research testing the model, participants were primed with words related to profit or equity before they played an economic game (Loersch & Payne, 2012) . In addition, the authors manipulated participants' perceptions of the source of their thoughts. When participants were led to believe that any thoughts that came to mind were their own, they behaved in a way that was consistent with the primes (i.e., they earned more money when primed with words related to profit than words related to equity). But when they were led to believe that any thoughts that came to mind were caused by the experimental task, participants did not act in line with the primes.
Within Loersch and Payne's (2012) study, the content of the primes varied across conditions, and it was assumed that all subjects within each condition had similar responses to the primes (i.e., profit primes activated thoughts about making money and equity primes activated thoughts about fairness). The present studies, in contrast, presented the same primes to all participants (i.e., gay and heterosexual couples) and measured individual differences in the type of responses. In this case, the relevant source attribution is whether responses to the primes are self-generated or not. For example, consider an individual who has negative feelings toward the primes depicting gay couples and then is asked whether he or she would trust a gay male schoolteacher to be alone with a child. To the degree that the prime elicited negative feelings, these feelings may affect responses to the subsequent question about the schoolteacher. However, the prime should only have this effect to the extent that the primed thoughts are attributed to oneself. In contrast, if the individual attributes the thoughts to sources external to the self (e.g., cultural stereotypes, rumors, or the experimenter's suggestion), then the subject is likely to discount these feelings when answering the subsequent question about the schoolteacher. Thus, whether primed information affects subsequent judgments and behaviors should depend on whether this information is owned by the self.
In the present article, we predicted that thoughts about ownership for implicit attitudes should determine whether those implicit attitudes are used when constructing explicit attitudes. Our perspective is similar to the argument of Gawronski et al. (2008) in that both perspectives view ownership of attitudes as subjective metacognitive judgments. The perspective of the current manuscript differs from that of Gawronski et al. (2008) , however, because they suggest that people perceive a mental association as personal to the degree that they perceive it as valid. In contrast, we argue that inferences of ownership, as distinct from validity, can have important consequences for explicit endorsement of attitudes.
In most cases, of course, inferences of ownership and inferences of validity tend to be correlated. People rarely say, "This is my opinion, even though it is untrue." And yet, perceptions of ownership and validity do not always go hand in hand. People battling craving might recognize the craving as their own and yet consider it unreasonable, unjustified, or otherwise invalid. Likewise, a person struggling with obsessive or ruminative thoughts may consider those thoughts invalid and yet still see them as his or her own. Most relevant to the present research, prejudice is probably a common source of fissures between ownership and validity. Anecdotally, when students learn for the first time about implicit bias by completing an implicit test, they often express surprise at the notion that they hold attitudes that they themselves consider invalid. At least some people may perceive that attitude as both personally owned and invalid. Based on this reasoning, we expected that perceptions of ownership and validity would be correlated but not identical.
Object Ownership and Attitudes Toward the Self
Existing research has examined the effect of ownership of tangible objects on attitudes toward those objects (Beggan, 1992) . This research finds that people feel more positively toward objects that they have chosen to own as compared with unchosen alternatives. A common interpretation of these findings is that positive views of the self are transferred to the owned object. Consistent with this interpretation, Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and Becker (2007) found that implicit evaluations of the self were associated with implicit evaluations of owned, but not un-owned, objects. In the present research, instead of measuring attitudes toward owned versus un-owned objects, we examine thoughts about ownership for attitudes themselves. We reason that when people have positive views of the self, perceptions of ownership for implicit attitudes should be interpreted as meaningful input for deciding whether to endorse those attitudes on an explicit measure. In particular, among those relatively high in selfesteem, accepting one's implicit evaluations as belonging to the self should lead people to express that bias on an explicit measure. That is, if I have positive views of the self, and this attitude is mine, then I am likely to endorse this attitude. In contrast, actively rejecting an implicit evaluation as not belonging to the self should lead those with relatively high self-esteem to reject that attitude on an explicit measure. If I have positive views of the self, and this attitude does not belong to me, then I am likely to disagree with the attitude.
When people have more negative views of the self, ownership information may be considered a less valuable source of information when constructing explicit attitude responses. That is, if I see myself as having little value, then it does not matter whether an attitude belongs to me or not. We did not have specific predictions about whether implicit-explicit correspondence would be high or low for individuals with relatively low self-esteem. But we predicted that perceptions of ownership should be relatively less important for those with relatively low self-esteem.
Overview of Studies
In three studies, we tested the prediction that when participants construe implicit attitudes toward gay men as their own, they will be more likely to report those attitudes explicitly. Furthermore, we predicted that inferences of attitude ownership would have the strongest effect on implicitexplicit attitude correspondence among those who have positive views of the self (i.e., who have relatively high self-esteem). The present experiments studied attitudes toward gay men because prejudice against a stigmatized group highlights cases in which people may be motivated to consider their implicit responses to reflect something outside of their own attitudes.
In Study 1, we examined the causal influence of perceived ownership by manipulating metacognitions of ownership for implicit attitudes. We predicted that implicit and explicit attitudes would be more highly associated in the condition that encouraged subjects to perceive their implicit responses as their own attitudes. In Study 2, we measured, rather than manipulated, inferences of ownership for implicit responses and also measured self-esteem. We predicted that implicit and explicit attitudes would be more highly associated among individuals who perceived their implicit responses as their own attitudes. Given the centrality of the self to ownership, we expected that inferences of ownership may have stronger effects for those with relatively high self-esteem. Finally, in Study 3, we again manipulated ownership for implicit attitudes, but this time included a measure of selfesteem. We predicted that our manipulation of ownership would have a stronger effect on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence among those who were relatively high in self-esteem.
Study 1
Study 1 manipulated metacognitive inferences about implicit attitudes toward gay men and then examined subsequent explicit attitudes. We hypothesized that leading participants to think of their implicit attitudes as their own would increase implicit-explicit attitude correspondence.
Participants
Participants were 40 undergraduate students (31 women) from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. They received course credit for participation. This sample size was based on a power analysis using G*Power, which indicated that 20 participants per cell would provide adequate power (1 − β > .80) to detect a medium-sized difference in slopes (Δb = .08) between conditions.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed a demographic questionnaire and then completed the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) to measure implicit responses to gay and opposite-sex couples.
Measure of implicit attitudes. The AMP included 64 trials in which a photo prime of either a gay couple or opposite-sex couple was presented for 125 ms, followed by a Chinese symbol for 100 ms, followed by a black and white pattern mask that remained on the screen until a response was made. The photos used as primes were 16 photos of gay male couples and 16 photos of opposite-sex couples in affectionate poses (e.g., embracing, holding hands, etc.) The same poses were represented equally often for gay and opposite-sex couples and each prime appeared twice. Participants were asked to rate each Chinese symbol as relatively more pleasant or less pleasant by pressing one of two keys on each trial. Participants were warned that the primes could influence their judgments, and they were instructed to try their best to ignore photo primes and to make judgments based solely on how pleasant or unpleasant they found the Chinese symbols to be.
Ownership manipulation. After completing the implicit measure, participants were randomly assigned to either the personal (ownership) inference group or the extra-personal inference group. To manipulate perceived ownership, we took advantage of the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) by asking participants either to consider reasons that their feelings during the implicit task reflect their own attitudes or to consider reasons that their feelings do not reflect their own attitudes. The following instructions were used to manipulate metacognitive inferences: While completing the picture task, you may have had a "gut feeling" towards the pictures of heterosexuals and homosexuals. Research has found that this gut feeling usually reflects [does NOT reflect] people's genuine attitude towards homosexuality . . . For the purpose of this study, we'd like you to write two to three (2-3) reasons why the feelings you felt during the picture task ARE [are NOT] your own attitude . . .
Measurement of explicit attitudes.
Finally, participants completed the Modern Homophobia Scale (MHS) to assess explicit attitudes (Raja & Stokes, 1998) . The scale includes separate subscales for attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, but for these studies we only assessed attitudes toward gay men. Participants responded to 22 items (e.g., "I am comfortable with the thought of two men being romantically involved," and "I would remove my child from class if I found out the teacher was gay") on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Results
Preliminary analyses. Three participants pressed the same key on all trials and were excluded from analyses, leaving a final sample of 37. Mean AMP scores in the pre-test displayed significant levels of bias. The proportion of pleasant responses was much higher on opposite-sex prime trials (M = 0.86, SD = 0.15) than gay prime trials (M = 0.46, SD = 0.30), F(1, 36) = 47.47, p < .001, η p 2 = .95. We created implicit bias scores for each participant by taking the difference between the proportion of pleasant responses on opposite-sex prime trials versus gay prime trials (higher scores reflect a preference for opposite-sex couples). The AMP index showed high internal consistency (α = .94) as did the MHS (α = .94).
Main analyses. Our primary hypothesis was that explicit attitude reports would be more consistent with implicit attitudes among participants encouraged to own their implicit responses as compared with those encouraged to disown their implicit responses. We tested this hypothesis by estimating the parameters of a hierarchical multiple regression model predicting explicit prejudice from condition (1 = personal inference; −1 = extra-personal inference), implicit bias, and the Implicit bias × Condition interaction. All variables were standardized prior to analysis.
In the first block, we entered implicit bias and condition. Neither the main effect for implicit bias, b = .14, t = 0.78, 
Discussion
These effects illustrate that metacognitive inferences of ownership can have dramatic consequences for whether implicit bias becomes explicit prejudice. Those participants who were led to think of their gut reactions toward gay men as personally owned were subsequently more likely to express their implicit bias on an explicit measure. This provides preliminary evidence that metacognitive inferences of ownership may play a causal role in transforming implicit bias into explicit prejudice. However, it is also possible that our manipulation of ownership introduced demand characteristics (Orne, 1962) . Therefore, in Study 2, we measured, rather than manipulated, inferences of ownership.
In Study 2, we also extended our Study 1 findings in two ways. First, we tested whether self-esteem moderates the effect of ownership inferences on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. In particular, we reasoned that the effect of metacognitions of ownership for implicit attitudes may differ depending on whether a person has positive or negative views of the self. Such a hypothesis builds from existing research on the effect of self-esteem on evaluations of chosen versus unchosen objects (Beggan, 1992) to examine the downstream consequences of accepting or rejecting attitudes as one's own. We predicted that people with relatively high self-esteem should be more likely to value ownership information and thus more likely to use ownership information when forming their attitudes on explicit measures. As a result, those with positive views of the self who think of implicit attitudes as owned should be likely to express implicit bias as explicit prejudice; those with positive views of the self who reject implicit attitudes as unrelated to the self may then reject their implicit bias on an explicit measure. In contrast, those with relatively low self-esteem may place less value on ownership information and, thus, be less likely to use ownership information when forming explicit attitudes.
Second, we included a measure of perceived validity of implicit attitudes. Some authors have suggested that ownership may go hand in hand with endorsement of an attitude as true or valid (Gawronski et al., 2008) . Therefore, by measuring and controlling for perceived validity, we wanted to test whether the effects of ownership inferences occurred above and beyond the effects of related inferences of validity.
Study 2
In Study 2, we hypothesized that naturally varying inferences of ownership for implicit attitudes would have important consequences for subsequently reported explicit attitudes about gay men. Participants who self-report thinking that their implicit reactions are their own should be most likely to report these attitudes on an explicit measure (even when controlling for perceptions of validity). Moreover, those participants who have the most positive views of the self should be most likely to use ownership inferences as information when forming their explicit judgments.
Method
Participants. Participants were 45 undergraduate students (30 females) from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The sample size was based on the same power considerations as Study 1. Participants received course credit for their time.
Procedure
Measurement of implicit attitudes. After signing an informed consent, participants completed the same AMP as in Study 1. Note. Adjusted means for explicit bias plotted against implicit bias, by ownership manipulation. All variables were standardized, and implicit bias is plotted at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean, Experiment 1.
Measurement of perceived ownership and perceived validity.
Next, participants were asked to answer questions about the feelings they felt toward the photo primes. Specifically, they responded to the following three items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): "My immediate feelings reflect my own beliefs about homosexuals," "My gut reactions reflect my genuine attitude toward homosexuals," and "My gut reactions have nothing to do with my real attitude toward gay people" (reverse scored). These items comprised our measure of perceived ownership for implicit attitudes (α = .72). To measure perceived validity, participants then rated their agreement to the following items using the same scale as the ownership questions: "My gut reactions reflect accurate beliefs about homosexuals"; "My gut reactions do NOT necessarily reflect true beliefs about homosexuals (reverse scored)"; "My immediate reactions toward homosexuals are valid." This measure of perceived validity was reliable (α = .84).
Explicit measures. Finally, participants completed the MHS (α = .96) to assess explicit attitudes (Raja & Stokes, 1998) and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE) Scale (α = .91) to measure attitudes toward the self (Rosenberg, 1965) .
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses. Because of the use of Chinese symbols in the AMP, three participants who reported being able to read Chinese were removed from the sample, leaving a final sample of 42 participants. Average AMP responses were analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA. As in Study 1, the proportion of pleasant responses was much greater on opposite-sex prime trials (M = 0.80, SD = 0.16) than on same-sex prime trials (M = 0.42, SD = 0.28), F(1, 41) = 52.29, p < .001, η p 2 = .56. The AMP index was reliable (α = .92) and implicit bias scores were computed as in Study 1. Overall, participants demonstrated high self-esteem (M = 47.17, SD = 10.02; on a scale with a maximum of 60).
As might be expected, inferences of attitude ownership were correlated with inferences of attitude validity, r = .71, p < .001. Because of this strong relationship between inferences of ownership and inferences of validity, the following analyses control for inferences of validity. Controlling for validity allowed us to examine the role of ownership above and beyond its shared variance with inferences of validity (however, results do not change whether we do or do not control for validity). All variables were standardized for the following analyses. Table 1 shows the correlations among our variables.
Main analyses
Effect of measured ownership and self-esteem on implicitexplicit correspondence. First, we examined whether inferences that implicit bias belongs to the self (i.e., are owned) had different effects for people relatively high and low in self-esteem. To do this, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting explicit prejudice from implicit bias, ownership, self-esteem, all two-way interactions, and the critical three-way interaction of Self-esteem × Implicit bias × Ownership.
In the first step, we added perceived validity to control for the variability that is shared between perceptions of ownership and perceptions of validity of implicit attitudes. There was a main effect of perceived validity such that perceiving one's gut feelings as more valid was associated with greater explicit prejudice, b = .50, t = 3.66, p = .001 (95% CI = [0.22, 0.78]).
In the second step, we entered our three predictors of selfesteem, implicit bias, and perceived ownership. This analysis revealed a single significant main effect for implicit bias, In the third step, we added all two-way interactions. First, there was a marginal unpredicted two-way interaction of self-esteem and implicit bias, b = −.27, t = 1.70, p = .10 (95% CI = [−0.60, 0.05] ). This marginal interaction indicates that those low in self-esteem tended to show greater implicitexplicit attitude correspondence than those high in selfesteem. There was also a two-way interaction of Implicit bias × Ownership, b = .46, t = 3.54, p = .001 (95% CI = [0.20, 0.72]). Those who were high in perceived ownership for their implicit bias subsequently showed greater implicitexplicit attitude correspondence than those who were low in ownership. This significant two-way interaction conceptually replicates the significant Implicit bias × Condition interaction in Study 1, except instead of manipulating ownership, we measured it.
In the final step of our hierarchical regression analysis, we entered the three-way interaction. Supporting our hypotheses, we found that the two-way interactions were qualified by a significant three-way interaction of Self-esteem × Implicit bias × Ownership, b = .48, t = 3.16, p = .003 (95% CI = [0.17, 0.79]) (see Figure 2) .
To decompose the three-way interaction, we used Hayes's (2013) PROCESS macro. We examined the Implicit bias × Ownership interaction separately for those who were relatively high in self-esteem (+1 SD) and those who were relatively low in self-esteem (−1 SD). This analysis indicated that the Implicit bias × Ownership interaction was significant for those relatively high in self-esteem (+1 SD), b = .90, t = 4.97, p < .001 (95% CI = [0.53, 1.27]), but not for those relatively low in self-esteem (−1 SD), b = −.06, t = 0.47, p = .35 (95% CI = [−0.47, 0.35]). Therefore, we next decomposed this two-way interaction of Implicit bias × Ownership for those who were relatively high in self-esteem.
We tested the simple effects among relatively high selfesteem participants by estimating the parameters of the regression model while self-esteem was centered at 1 SD above the mean. Among those relatively high in self-esteem, those who were high in perceived ownership of implicit bias showed a significant positive relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes, b = .92, t = 3.96, p < .001 (95% CI = [0.45, 1.40]). This simple effect indicates that those who both have positive views of the self and viewed their implicit bias as owned by the self subsequently endorsed their implicit bias on an explicit measure. Interestingly, among participants who were relatively high in self-esteem but low in ownership for implicit bias, implicit and explicit attitudes were significantly negatively correlated, b = −.88, t = 3.25, p = .003 (95% CI = [−1.44, −0.33]). This negative correlation suggests that rejecting one's implicit bias as not reflecting the self led participants with positive views of the self to reject implicit bias on an explicit measure.
Next, we decomposed the three-way interaction of selfesteem, implicit bias, and ownership to look at the two-way interaction of implicit bias and self-esteem separately for those high (+1 SD) and low (−1 SD) in ownership for implicit attitudes. This analysis revealed that among those high in ownership, the implicit bias by self-esteem interaction was not significant, b = .11, t = 0.60, p = .55 (95% CI = [−0.27, 0.49]). Implicit and explicit attitudes were positively associated for participants relatively high in self-esteem (b = .92, p < .001) and participants relatively low in self-esteem (b = .69, p = .006).
Among those relatively low in ownership for their implicit attitudes, the self-esteem by implicit bias interaction was significant, b = −.85, t = 3.66, p < .001 (95% CI = [−1.33, −0.38]). Simple effects indicated that those relatively high in self-esteem showed a significant negative correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes, b = −.88, t = 3.25, p = .003 (95% CI = [−1.44, −0.33]). This suggests that subjects who have positive views of the self used their perception that the attitude was not their own as a cue to reject the attitude explicitly. Conversely, those who were relatively low in selfesteem showed a significant positive relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes, b = .82, t = 2.62, p = .01 (95% CI = [0.19, 1.46]). These subjects with relatively low selfesteem did not appear to use (the lack of) perceived ownership as a cue to reject the attitude explicitly.
Discussion
Overall, as predicted, the subjective perception of ownership for implicit attitudes was associated with a greater endorsement of those attitudes on an explicit measure. Importantly, despite the focus of previous models of metacognition on inferences of validity, removing the effects of perceived validity in our regression equation did not diminish the effect of perceived ownership. Not only do these findings indicate that metacognitions of ownership and validity are distinct, but they also support our hypothesis that inferences of ownership play an important role in whether implicit bias is explicitly expressed.
These results also extend our Study 1 findings in another way. Although Study 1 indicated an overall effect of manipulated inferences of ownership on implicit-explicit correspondence, in Study 2 we hypothesized that the effect of Note. Adjusted means for explicit bias plotted against implicit bias by measured levels of attitude ownership and self-esteem. All variables were standardized and implicit bias is plotted at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean, Experiment 2.
ownership inferences may depend on participants' selfesteem. Consistent with this reasoning, in Study 2, we found that self-esteem moderated the effect of naturally occurring ownership inferences on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. In fact, ownership inferences affected implicit-explicit attitude correspondence among those relatively high in selfesteem but not relatively low in self-esteem. Among those with positive views of the self, accepting implicit bias as owned led to similar levels of bias on an implicit and explicit measure; however, thinking of implicit bias as relatively extra-personal led to an explicit rejection of implicit bias. These are the results we would expect if participants are using ownership information in forming their judgments on an explicit measure. Interestingly, it seemed that those who had more negative views of the self did not use ownership information when forming their responses on an explicit measure. These results are consistent with, but distinct from, other research that has examined the role of self-esteem in traditional ownership effects (Beggan, 1992; Gawronski et al., 2007) . Research on ownership effects for tangible objects indicates that views of the self are transferred onto owned (but not unchosen) objects. In the present context of owning implicit bias, it seems that ownership information only matters in forming explicit prejudice among those who have relatively positive views of the self. These findings are not inconsistent with existing ownership effects but rather indicate that owning or rejecting an attitude is likely distinct from evaluating an owned versus un-owned object. Perhaps, if research on object ownership were to compare evaluations of owned objects to actively avoided or rejected objects (rather than unchosen alternatives), results would mirror our pattern of findings.
Although we did not measure self-esteem in Study 1, the significant three-way interaction with self-esteem in Study 2 leads us to believe that our Study 1 findings were likely driven by a sample that was relatively high in self-esteem. This would not be surprising given the general tendency for people to have positive views of the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988) ; as well as the high average self-esteem score in Study 2 (M = 47.16 out of 60) among participants drawn from the same undergraduate population as Study 1. Therefore, in Study 3 we directly tested whether our manipulation of ownership (as manipulated in Study 1) would affect implicitexplicit correspondence most strongly among those high in self-esteem (as measured in Study 2).
Study 3
In Study 3, we both manipulated inferences of ownership and measured ownership and self-esteem. This design enabled us first to test whether our manipulation effectively changed self-reports of ownership for implicit attitudes. Second, we were able to test whether the effect of our manipulation on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence varied with self-esteem.
Participants
Eighty-one undergraduates participated in return for course credit. Minimum sample size was calculated using the same analysis as Study 1 and Study 2. Data from 2 participants who reported being able to read Chinese pictographs and 4 people who pressed the same button throughout the AMP were dropped from analyses. This left a final sample of 75 participants (48 women).
Procedure
Measurement of implicit attitudes. As in the first two studies, participants began by completing the AMP measuring implicit attitudes toward same-sex and opposite-sex couples.
Manipulation of Ownership Inferences
The manipulation was the same as in Study 1.
Measurement of ownership.
Participants next answered the same three questions used in Study 2 to assess the degree to which they owned their implicit attitudes. In addition to perceived ownership (α = .85), we measured perceived validity (α = .86) using the same items used in Study 2.
Explicit measures. Finally, participants completed the MHS to measure explicit attitudes (α = .97) and the RSE Scale (α = .87).
Results

Preliminary Analyses
Replicating the previous studies, the proportion of pleasant responses was greater on opposite-sex prime trials (M = 0.75, SD = 0.18) than on gay prime trials (M = 0.45, SD = 0.29), F(1, 74) = 50.07, p < .001, η p 2 = .40. Pleasant responses on gay prime trials were subtracted from those on opposite-sex trials to measure preferences for opposite-sex over gay couples. The AMP index showed high internal consistency (α = .94). Overall implicit bias was correlated with explicit bias, r = .68, p < .001, and inferences of ownership were highly related with inferences of validity, r = .72, p < .001. As in Study 2, participants had relatively high levels of self-esteem (M = 48.19, SD = 7.4). All variables were standardized for the following regression analyses. Table 2 shows the correlations among variables.
Main Analyses
Manipulation check. As predicted, participants in the personal inference group reported greater ownership of implicit responses (M = 15.33, SD = 3.84) than those in the extrapersonal inference group (M = 12.43, SD = 3.66), F(1, 74) = 11.16, p = .001, η p 2 = .13.
Effect of manipulation and self-esteem on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. First, we tested whether our manipulation had different effects on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence based on participants' self-esteem. Because we measured self-esteem after our manipulation, we first tested whether our manipulation inadvertently affected participants' self-esteem. Self-esteem among those in the personal inference group (M = 49.03, SD = 7.80) did not differ significantly from self-esteem among those in the extra-personal group (M = 47.52, SD = 7.13), F(1, 74) = .76, p = .39, η p 2 = .01. Thus, we next tested our main hypothesis by estimating the parameters of a hierarchical multiple regression model predicting explicit prejudice from self-esteem, implicit bias, and condition, all two-way interactions, and the critical three-way interaction of our predictors. Because of the strong correlation between inferences of validity and inferences of ownership, we also controlled for inferences of validity. However, as in Study 2, whether we include perceived validity as a control variable does not affect the results of any analyses.
In the first step of our regression analysis, we included perceived validity to control for the shared variability of perceived validity and perceived ownership in our analyses. There was a marginal effect of perceived validity on explicit attitudes, b = .20, t = 1.75, p = .08 (95% CI = [−0.03, 0.43]).
In the second step, we added our predictor variables including self-esteem, implicit bias, and experimental condition. The only significant main effect was for implicit bias, b = .70, t = 8.43, p < .001 (95% CI = [0.53, 0.86]), indicating that implicit and explicit bias were positively correlated overall.
In block three, we entered the two-way interactions of our three predictor variables. No two-way interactions reached significance, ps > .33.
Finally, in block four, we added our predicted three-way interaction of self-esteem, implicit bias, and condition. This predicted three-way interaction was marginally significant, b = .16, t = 1.93, p = .06 (95% CI = [−0.00, 0.34]). This interaction is depicted in Figure 3 .
To decompose the marginal three-way interaction, we used Hayes's (2013) PROCESS macro. First, we looked at the Implicit bias × Condition interaction separately at high and low levels of self-esteem. This interaction was marginally significant for those relatively high (+1 SD) in self-esteem, b = .20, t = 1.82, p = .07 (95% CI = [−0.02, 0.42]), but not relatively low (−1 SD) in self-esteem, b = −.13, t = 1.00, p = .32 (95% CI = [−0.38, 0.13]). Next, we decomposed the marginal two-way interaction of Implicit bias × Condition for those high in self-esteem.
Among those relatively high in self-esteem, those who were in the personal inference condition showed a significant positive relationship between implicit bias and explicit prejudice, b = .85, t = 5.51, p < .001 (95% CI = [0.54, 1.15]). The association between implicit and explicit attitudes for those in the extra-personal inference condition was in the same direction and significant, albeit to a lesser degree, b = .44, t = 2.75, p = .008 (95% CI = [0.12, 0.76]). The slopes were significantly different, as indicated by the fact that each slope falls outside the other slope's CI.
Next, we broke down the marginal three-way interaction of self-esteem, implicit bias, and condition to analyze the self-esteem by implicit bias interaction separately for those in the personal inference condition and the extra-personal inference condition. Results revealed the same patterns as in Study 2. Among those in the personal inference condition, the self-esteem by implicit bias interaction was not significant, b = .11, t = 0.92, p = .36 (95% CI = [−0.12, 0.34]). Instead, implicit and explicit attitudes were positively associated for participants relatively high in self-esteem (b = .84, p < .001) and participants relatively low in self-esteem (b = .63 p < .001).
Among those in the extra-personal inference condition, the self-esteem by implicit bias interaction was marginally significant, b = −.22, t = 1.76, p = .08 (95% CI = [−0.47, 0.03]). To examine this marginal two-way interaction, we next examined the simple effects for those relatively high (+1 SD) and low (−1 SD) in self-esteem. Among those relatively low in self-esteem, the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes was again strong and positive, b = .88, t = 4.99, p < .001 (95% CI = [0.53, 1.24]). Among those relatively high in self-esteem, implicit and explicit attitudes were positively correlated but the association was much smaller, b = .44, t = 2.75, p = .008 (95% CI = [0.12, 0.76]). These slopes were significantly different from one another as indicated by the fact that each slope falls outside the other slope's confidence interval.
Discussion
Results of Study 3 conceptually replicated our results from Study 2 but with manipulated rather than measured inferences of ownership. First, we confirmed that our manipulation had the intended effect by showing that participants in the personal inference condition reported significantly more ownership for their implicit attitudes than those in the extrapersonal inference condition. Next, we examined whether the effect of our manipulation on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence depended on self-esteem. Consistent with predictions, self-esteem marginally moderated the effect of our manipulation on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. Participants who had relatively high self-esteem and also thought of their implicit attitudes as owned subsequently endorsed their implicit bias on an explicit measure. Participants relatively high in self-esteem who overtly rejected their implicit attitudes were less likely to report their implicit bias on an explicit measure. Also consistent with Study 2, those who were relatively low in self-esteem tended to disregard ownership inferences and defaulted to showing consistency between their implicit and explicit attitudes regardless of condition.
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Together the results of Study 3 are consistent with the results of Study 2. In particular, results demonstrate that when individuals infer that their implicit responses reflect their own attitudes, these implicit responses affect explicitly stated attitudes. Furthermore, metacognitions about ownership for implicit attitudes seem to be most influential among people who hold particularly positive views of the self.
Meta-Analyses of Effects From Studies 1 to 3
Because our samples were somewhat small in Studies 1 and 2, we next conducted two random-effects meta-analyses to assess the overall effect size of the Ownership × Implicit bias interaction and the Ownership × Implicit bias × Self-esteem interaction across studies.
First, we ran a random-effects meta-analysis to assess the effect size of the Ownership × Implicit bias interaction across Studies 1 through 3 using the guidelines of Neyeloff, Fuchs, and Moreira (2012) . This analysis included the manipulated Ownership × Implicit bias interaction from Study 1, the measured Ownership × Implicit bias interaction from Study 2, and the manipulated Ownership × Implicit bias interaction from Study 3. This meta-analysis revealed a significant overall interaction effect, M (weighted effect size) = 0.28, Z = 1.95, p = .05. Across the three studies, implicit-explicit correspondence was significantly greater among those who owned their implicit attitudes.
Next, we ran a random-effects meta-analysis to estimate whether the two-way interaction of ownership and implicit bias was moderated by self-esteem. In this analysis, we included the measured Ownership × Implicit bias × Selfesteem interaction from Study 2 and the manipulated Ownership × Implicit bias × Self-esteem interaction from Study 3. This overall interaction effect was marginally significant, M (weighted effect size) = 0.30, Z = 1.89, p = .058. This marginal effect indicates that across two studies, ownership for implicit attitudes was associated with increased implicit-explicit correspondence, especially among those relatively high in self-esteem.
General Discussion
Inferences of ownership for implicit responses have important consequences for whether those implicit responses function like personal attitudes by being reported on an explicit measure. In Study 1, we manipulated inferences of ownership for implicit attitudes and examined subsequent implicitexplicit attitude correspondence. When participants listed reasons why their implicit responses were not their own, they later reported explicit attitudes that were only weakly associated with implicit responses. In contrast, when they listed reasons why their implicit responses reflected their own attitudes, implicit and explicit attitudes were highly associated. Through our direct manipulation of metacognitions, Study 1 provides evidence that metacognitions of ownership may play a causal role in increasing implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. However, our manipulation also raises the possibility that demand characteristics could have driven our effects. Therefore, in Study 2, we measured naturally occurring variability in ownership of implicit attitudes. Consistent Note. Adjusted means for explicit bias plotted against implicit bias, by ownership manipulation and self-esteem. All variables were standardized, and implicit bias is plotted at 1 standard deviation above and below the mean, Experiment 3.
with our hypotheses, and inconsistent with a demand explanation, participants who reported greater ownership for their implicit attitudes subsequently reported explicit bias that was more strongly related to their implicit bias than those who reported less ownership.
Study 2 also extended our Study 1 findings in two important ways. First, we demonstrated that metacognitions of ownership for implicit attitudes accounted for variability in explicit attitudes above and beyond metacognitions of attitude validity. This comparison is important given the focus of existing metacognitive models on inferences of validity or truth. We should note, however, that our analyses were not dependent on including perceived validity in the model as a covariate; instead perceived validity was a theoretically driven covariate that was included in our analyses to demonstrate that perceptions of ownership had unique effects on our dependent variable. The second theoretical extension provided in Study 2 was measuring the role of self-esteem. We reasoned that perceiving one's gut reactions as owned by the self would have different effects for people with relatively positive and negative views of the self. Again consistent with our reasoning, there was a three-way interaction of measured self-esteem, implicit bias, and ownership. Inferences of ownership for implicit bias affected whether implicit bias led to explicit prejudice among those who had relatively high self-esteem. In particular, among those with comparatively high levels of self-esteem (+1 SD), inferences of ownership were used in constructing explicit attitudes such that when implicit bias was thought to belong to the self, this bias was expressed on an explicit measure; in contrast, rejecting implicit bias as unrelated to the self led relatively high self-esteem participants to subsequently reject their implicit bias on an explicit measure. Those who were lower in self-esteem (−1 SD) showed lower value for the self as well as information about the self: among this group, ownership information did not change whether implicit bias became explicit prejudice.
In Study 3, we again manipulated inferences of ownership for implicit attitudes but this time also measured self-esteem and measured perceptions of ownership. We reasoned that manipulating participants to view their implicit attitudes as owned by the self may have different effects for people who have positive versus negative views of the self. Furthermore, we wanted to verify that our manipulation had its effects on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence by changing perceptions of ownership. Results supported these hypotheses. First, our manipulation changed self-reports of ownership as intended. Second, the effect of our manipulation depended on whether participants had relatively positive or negative views of the self. While our manipulation did not have a significant effect on implicit-explicit attitude correspondence among those relatively low in self-esteem, among those relatively high self-esteem, participants showed marginally stronger implicit-explicit attitude correspondence when led to think of their implicit attitudes as owned as compared with disowned. These findings are consistent with, and expand upon, research on ownership effects (Beggan, 1992) .
Existing research on ownership effects indicate that people's evaluations of the self dictate their evaluations of objects they have chosen to own but are unrelated to unchosen alternatives (Gawronski et al., 2007) . Specifically, people who have positive views of the self positively evaluate owned objects, while people who have negative views of the self negatively evaluate owned objects. In the current research, we extend these findings to examine the downstream consequences of owning implicit attitudes. In this novel context of owning attitudes rather than objects, we find that people's evaluations of the self dictate whether thoughts about ownership for implicit attitudes are used as information in future judgments. In particular, for people with positive views of the self, thoughts about ownership matter: Owned implicit attitudes are endorsed on an explicit measure and disowned attitudes are rejected on an explicit measure. In contrast, people with relatively negative views of the self seem to discount ownership information such that thoughts about ownership are unrelated to whether implicit attitudes are expressed on an explicit measure. Thus, whereas research on object ownership indicates that self-esteem only affects evaluations of owned (but not unchosen) objects, the current findings indicate that self-esteem dictates whether perceptions of ownership for implicit attitudes influence future judgments.
Metacognitive Models and Social Constructionism
Together, our results are consistent with dual process theories that emphasize metacognitive inferences about implicit attitudes. The APE and MCM focus on inferences of validity and truth about implicit attitudes for explicit expression of bias. However, while both the APE (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) and the MCM (Petty et al., 2007) focus on inferences of validity (i.e., "is my attitude accurate?"), we presented evidence that other kinds of inferences should also be important. Our previous research highlights the importance of inferences of intent for implicit-explicit attitude correspondence (Cooley et al., 2014) , and the current research extends these findings to inferences of ownership.
Our findings also provide direct support for the SIM (Loersch & Payne, 2012) which predicts when and how primes will influence our future behavior. This model presumes that multiple factors will serve as input in determining how and whether primed information affects future behavior. One basic premise behind this model is that primed information will only influence behavior to the degree that the information is perceived as originating from the self. Here we show that metacognitions of ownership, indeed, play an integral role in determining whether people use primed reactions as a basis for future explicit judgments.
Both the current research and our previous research (Cooley et al., 2014) have examined the role of metacognitions about the origin of, and intent behind, implicit attitudes in the expression of explicit prejudice. However, it is also possible that thoughts about the meaning of the affect elicited by implicit measures such as the AMP influence subsequently reported attitudes. Future research should assess whether thoughts about the specific emotion represented by generalized negative affect on an implicit measure may have important consequences for explicit prejudice. Such research would build on the existing and growing literature on the social construction of emotion (see Lindquist, 2013 for review). These constructionist accounts of emotion reason that distinct emotions arise from a dynamic combination of bottom-up physiological reactions (i.e., core affect) and subjective interpretations of the situation in which those reactions occur (Barrett, 2011; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008) . As a result, these models argue that the same physiological experience can lead to very different conceptual emotion labels (and accompanying phenomenal experiences) depending on the emergent combination of multiple input systems. Extending this perspective to the present research, a negative "gut feeling" toward a gay couple could be interpreted as a personal attitude, or as irrelevant for one's personal attitudes; as an intentional evaluation of gay couples, or as an unintended fluke; as a valid attitude, or as a false impression; as hostile prejudice or sympathetic commiserating.
Our results also have implications for theoretical debates about the phenomenology of implicit attitudes. Many researchers have used the term implicit as synonymous with "unconscious" when referring to attitudes, leading to the assumption that people are unaware of the content of their implicit attitudes. However, careful studies have recently shown that people can be quite accurate at reporting the content of their implicitly measured attitudes, at least under certain conditions (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2013) . This research, as well as our own research, suggests that people have introspective access to their implicit attitudes. Nonetheless, the findings reviewed above suggest that implicit attitudes can be construed in multiple, malleable ways. This suggests a different type of lack of awareness: People may be aware of their affective response and still make mistakes about (or have malleable interpretations of) the quality and meaning of their experience. Although early research on implicit bias assumed that overcoming the influence of implicit biases would require effort and constant vigilance (e.g., Bargh, 1999) , changing construals of one's implicit responses might change the perceived meaning of automatic affective reactions without requiring effort and time. Such reasoning is consistent with constraint satisfaction approaches to the construction of emotion (Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007) and impression formation (Kunda & Thagard, 1996) , which argue that multiple sources of information can be integrated both automatically and with little effort. Therefore, the present research suggests that changing metacognitive construals of implicit associations may be an effective prejudice reduction strategy that is distinct from existing research that attempts to change the content of the implicit associations (e.g., Stewart & Payne, 2008) .
In sum, our studies suggest that the downstream effects of implicit bias are powerfully shaped by the ways participants construe their own responses. The question of who owns implicit attitudes is a puzzle not only for researchers but also for research subjects who must continually make meaning from the thoughts and feelings that seem simply to come to mind.
